



To: Republican Senators

From: Senator Jon Kyl

Date: October 28, 2003

Re: Senator Lugar's Op-Ed on Iran; Kyl-Feinstein Resolution on Iran's Nuclear Deadline

[Attached is an Op-Ed](#) on Iran written by Senator Richard Lugar that appeared in the *Los Angeles Times* last Friday (October 24).

On October 21, Iran “voluntarily” agreed to a British-French-German-brokered deal to halt its uranium enrichment program and allow tougher international inspections of its nuclear facilities, in exchange for European assistance in developing Iran’s civilian nuclear program. In his opinion article, Senator Lugar writes that while the decision by Tehran is a welcome step, “it should not lead us to a false sense of security about the Iranian proliferation threat or unwarranted confidence in current nonproliferation measures under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT, which Iran signed in 1968.”

The deal worked out by France, Germany, and Great Britain with Iran is, in the words of *The Economist*, “maddeningly vague.” The one-and-a-half page agreement fails to provide details on the following: How long is the suspension? Who will verify and monitor the suspension, and how? Will Iran be required to hand over the uranium that has already been enriched? Are there penalties if Tehran resumes uranium enrichment? If so, what are they and who enforces them? Will Iran end formally its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program?

Senator Lugar is exactly right that the United States should not be tricked or lulled into believing that Iran will shelve its nuclear ambitions, either temporarily or for the long term. In fact, the day Tehran agreed to this deal, its key negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, boldly stated that the agreement would serve for “an interim period,” and added that the suspension “could last for one day or one year; it depends on us.” This statement clearly demonstrates that Iran holds little regard for respecting its international obligations — and that Tehran remains an unreliable and untrustworthy partner.

On October 23, Iranian officials turned over an initial batch of documents to the U.N.’s atomic watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, IAEA

officials found — and Iranian officials admitted — that the documents were incomplete. Specifically, the records did not contain information about where Tehran acquired components for centrifuges that are used to enrich uranium. Tehran's response was that the components were purchased on the black market "through intermediaries." And, on October 26, the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement remarking that Tehran had not halted its uranium enrichment program but was only "currently studying suspending uranium enrichment."

Most significantly, the European agreement brokered with Tehran does nothing to negate the October 31 deadline established by the International Atomic Energy Agency for Iran to prove that it does not have a nuclear weapons program. This deadline, urged by Washington, was set on September 12, after the IAEA found traces of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium at an Iranian nuclear facility (Natanz), and requested access to the facility to determine whether Iran had violated its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran repeatedly refused to grant access to IAEA inspectors, as well as to sign an Additional Protocol to the NPT declaring that it would not pursue a nuclear weapons program.

A nuclear Iran would pose a serious threat to U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East and Europe. The need to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power is reinforced when one recognizes that Iran has an active program to improve its ballistic missile capability, is a leading state sponsor of terrorism, and is known to have shared missile designs and nuclear technology with other rogue states such as North Korea and Syria.

On October 15, Senators Feinstein and Kyl introduced a resolution (S. Con. Res. 73) expressing Congress' deep concern with Iran's failure to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and with Iran's activities to develop nuclear weapons.

Specifically, the resolution calls on Iran to "cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities until it is able to provide specific assurances that it is not engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program." Iran is directed to do so by "coming into complete and verifiable compliance with its obligations under the IAEA resolution, including the prompt and unconditional implementation of the Model Additional Protocol," and by "fully meeting its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

If Iran fails to comply, the resolution calls on the United Nations Security Council to immediately undertake consideration of "the passage of a Security Council resolution or the taking of other actions that may be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran."

Passage of the Kyl-Feinstein amendment would allow Congress to declare that Iran should not be allowed to pursue and possess a nuclear weapons program, and that sanctions and other means should be levied against Iran if it does not comply with the IAEA's October 31 deadline.

Slap Iran With Stiff Inspections

Iran's steady march toward the bomb took an apparent detour this week when Tehran announced that it would submit to new nuclear inspections and temporarily suspend its uranium enrichment program, which would have the capacity to produce nuclear

Its nuclear programs prove it can't be trusted, so strong action is needed now.

weapons material. This step is welcome, but it should not lead us to a false sense of security about the Iranian proliferation threat or unwarranted confidence in current nonproliferation measures under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NNPT, which Iran signed in 1970.

Iran took these measures under pressure from France, Britain and Germany and because it faced an Oct. 31 deadline set by the International Atomic Energy Agency to agree to them after Tehran's clandestine drive to acquire nuclear bomb material had been exposed by an Iranian opposition group and confirmed by the IAEA. Iran was secretly building a uranium enrichment facility, as well as a heavy-water reactor, which could be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Inspectors found weapons-grade uranium at two Iranian sites.

All are violations of Iran's NPT commitments, under which it pledged to forgo nuclear weap-


In such extreme cases, history has taught us to be skeptical about assurances of future com-

This depends less on the legal mechanisms of the NPT than it does on the will of the international community. When confronted with a case as blatant as Iran, the U.S. and like-minded allies must use the U.N. Security Council to demand that the violator cease all illegal weapons activities, dismantle weapons-related facilities and submit to inspections.

Some will object that such strong action may force Iran's

In the short run, our European allies will be inclined to give

Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.



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